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COMPUTER ABUSE: THE EMERGING CRIME
AND THE NEED FOR LEGISLATION
I. Introduction
Society is presently in the midst of a computer revolution.' Com-
puters have become irretrievably intertwined with the economic, so-
cial and political aspects of society.2 They are currently used in a
broad spectrum of activities 3 by banks, 4 financial institutions,5 fed-
eral," state and local governments, 7 educational institutions,8 health
1. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, COMPUTER RELATED
CRIME LEGISLATIVE RESOURCE MANUAL iii (1980) [hereinafter cited as LEGISLATIVE
RESOURCE MANUAL].
2. See generally Sokolik, Computer Crime-The Need for Deterrent Legisla-
tion, 2 COMPUTER L.J. 353, 357 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Sokolik]; Roddy, The
Federal Computer Systems Protection Act, 7 RUTGERS J. COMPUTERS, TECHNOLOGY &
L. 343, 349-50 (1979) [hereinafter cited as RODDY]. See also NEWS RELEASE, prepared
by Rep. Bill Nelson (D. Fla.) (Feb. 7, 1983) [hereinafter cited as NEWS RELEASE]
(more than two million computer operators, programmers, and technicians come in
contact with computers daily).
3. See Tunick, Computer Law: An Overview, 13 Loy. L.A.L. REV. 315 (1980).
4. Computers electronically dispense money, post deposits, transfer funds to
pay bills, and maintain accurate balances in bank accounts. See Volgyes, The Inves-
tigation, Prosecution, and Prevention of Computer Crime: A State-of-the-Art Re-
view, 2 COMPUTER L.J. 385 (1980) [hereinafter cited as VOLGYES].
5. See, e.g., Lynch, Fidelity Group Unit Speeds Banks' Entry into Discount
Stock Brokerage Business, Wall St. J., June 18, 1982, at 12, col. 1 (stock exchange is
relying more on computer automation); Witcher, New Exchange Plans Commodity
Trading through Computers, Wall St. J., Aug. 5, 1982, at 29, col. 1 (increased
computer use in commodities market); Hertzberg, Insurance Relying More on Auto-
mation, Wall St. J., Nov. 9, 1982, at 37, col. 3 (insurance industry is relying more on
computer technology).
6. The federal government relies on over 15,000 computers to maintain records,
disburse funds, and analyze information. See NEWS RELEASE, supra note 2. For
example, the Department of Defense disburses over $25 billion a year through more
than 3,000 computers; the Department of Health and Human Services processes over
$80 billion worth of checks per year utilizing a computer. See Federal Computer
Systems Protection Act: Hearings on S. 1766 Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Laws
and Procedures of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1978)
(opening statement of Senator Biden) [hereinafter cited as Hearings].
7. State and local governments utilize computers in a variety of functions such
as storing records and data, planning, budgeting, and word processing. See VOLGYES,
supra note 4, at 385-86.
8. American schools possess more than 100,000 computers for school use and
student training. See NEWS RELEASE, supra note 2. See generally Kolata, Students
Discover Computer Threat, SCIENCE, March 5, 1982, at 1216-17.
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care facilities,9 businesses, 10 and industry." The recent proliferation in
computer use has created an enormous volume of processed informa-
tion. While society has benefited from the emergence of the com-
puter, 12 the new technology also has engendered a new type of
crime: " computer crime. 14
Computer crime falls into four categories: 15 (1) theft of money,
financial instruments, property, services, or valuable data; 16 (2) unau-
9. Computers are prevalent in health care administration and patient treatment
in hospitals. See generally Waldolz, Computer Diagnosis of Medical Cases Gets
Mixed Reviews, Wall St. J., Aug. 19, 1982, at 7, col. 2; Shaffer, Technology, Wall
St. J., Apr. 9, 1982, at 21, col. 1.
10. It is estimated that businesses rely on more than 56,000 large general purpose
computers, 213,000 smaller business computers, 570,000 minicomputers, and 2.4
million desktop computers, with over three million computer terminals in business
offices. See NEWS RELEASE, supra note 2. See generally Fowler, Executives in the Next
Generation, N.Y. Times, Oct. 3, 1979, § 4, at 15, col. 2 (computers will play
increased role for company executives in coming years).
11. Computers are used in the manufacturing process to store records of inven-
tory, to maintain records of ordering, and in shipping, billing, and collections for
products. See Bigelow, The Lawyer's Role in the Computer Age [1972-1979 Transfer
Binder] 1 COMPUTER L. SERv. § 1-1, at 1-4.
12. See generally A. BEQUAI, COMPUTER CRIME 9 (1977); D. PARKER, CRIME BY
COMPUTER ix (1976). Some would characterize the relationship between society and
the computer as one of dependence since the use of computers is continually increas-
ing in the government and private sector. See Becker, COMPUTER CRIME AND SECUR-
ITY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV. 1 (1983) [hereinafter cited as COMPUTER CRIME AND
SECURITY]. See also Pollack, Computer Disaster: Business Seeks Antidote, N.Y.
Times, Aug. 24, 1983, at 1, col. 3.
13. See LAW ENFORCEMENT ASSISTANCE ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE,
COMPUTER CRIME vi (1979) [hereinafter cited as COMPUTER CRIME].
14. "Computer crime" does not have a uniform definition. Therefore, for the
purposes of this Note, it is defined as any knowing, fraudulent, illegal act that
involves a computer or knowledge of computer technology where loss has occurred.
See Parker, Computer Abuse Research Update, 2 COMPUTER L.J. 329, 330-31 (1980).
See also COMPUTER CRIME, supra note 13, at v.
15. See 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. REC. 1190 (1979).
16. This aspect of computer crime is given the most publicity. See, e.g., Gerth,
Embezzling Case at Wells Fargo: Keys are Computers and Volume, N.Y. Times,
Feb. 23, 1981, at 1, col. 3 (Wells Fargo National Bank lost more than $2.1 million in
a computerized embezzlement scheme involving a former bank officer and several
boxing promoters); Lindsey, U.S. Agency Reportedly Set up Suspect in Computer
Bank Fraud, N.Y. Times, March 20, 1979, at 1, col. 4 (computer consultant and
former college professor, Stanley Mark Rifkin, gained access to computer codes at the
Security Pacific Bank and, posing as a branch manager, used the bank's computer to
steal $10.2 million) (for an extensive discussion of the Rifkin Case see Becker,
Rifkin-A Documentary History, 2 COMPUTER L.J. 471 (1980)); Jensen, F.B.I. Said
to Find Equity Forgeries, N.Y. Times, Apr. 20, 1973, at 39, col. 6 (computer used by
Equity Funding Insurance Company to write thousands of phony insurance policies
and then to sell the policies to reinsurers, which generated over $27 million); Ball,
Computer Crime, TECHNOLOGY REVIEW, Apr. 1982, at 22 (college student, utilizing
his computer expertise, developed a scheme whereby he employed Pacific Bell's
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thorized access to computer time; 17 (3) illegal use of computer pro-
grams; "8 and (4) unauthorized acquisition of stored data.'9 The inci-
dence of crime in these four areas is increasing rapidly 20 and will
continue to proliferate. 21 Many commentators state that the criminal
computer to steal $1 million worth of telephone equipment); Fosburgh, Chief Teller
is Accused of Theft of $1.5 Million at a Bank Here, N.Y. Times, March 23, 1973, § 2,
at 1, col. 2 (bank teller at Union Dime Savings Bank in New York embezzled more
than $1.5 million through falsifying data utilizing an elaborate computer scheme).
For further examples of this type of computer crime see T. WHITESIDE, COMPUTER
CAPERS (1978).
17. This occurs when employees use their employer's computer for personal
reasons, such as compiling mailing lists for fraternal and church organizations,
drawing Snoopy calendars, calculating personal financial data, or playing games.
See Dotto, The New Computer Criminal, ATLAS WORLD PRESS REVIEW, Aug. 1979, at
25-26. At first glance, such computer abuse seems petty, but in the aggregate it is no
longer insignificant. See Ball, Computer Crime, TECHNOLOGY REVIEW, Apr. 1982, at
22. Recently, students have also been discovered using school computer time for
wrongful activity. See Kihss, Computer Caper in Dalton School is a Closed Book,
N.Y. Times, July 7, 1980, at 49, col. 2 (students at Dalton, a private school in New
York City, used teaching computers to invade a Canadian data communications
network and in the process destroyed the files of two of the network's corporate
customers).
18. Theft of computer programs was the basis for charges in Hancock v. Texas,
402 S.W.2d 906 (Tex. Crim. App. 1966), aff'd sub nom., Hancock v. Decker, 379
F.2d 552 (5th Cir. 1967) (defendant was convicted for theft of fifty-nine computer
programs from his employer). See also Kleiman, Hospital in City Reports Computer
Tampering, N.Y. Times, Aug. 19, 1983, at 1, col. 2; Treaster, Trial and Error by
Intruders Led to Entry into Computers, N.Y. Times, Aug. 23, 1983, at 1, col. 5
(young men, using a home computer, gained access to and reprogrammed computer
containing records of patients at Memorial Sloan-Kettering Cancer Center in Man-
hattan).
19. This occurs where the computer is used to acquire or alter stored data for
personal gain. See, e.g., Fuerbringer, U.S. Says Ex-Aide Stole its Computer Data,
N.Y. Times, Feb. 23, 1983, at 1, col. 2 (former Federal Reserve Board economist was
charged with wire fraud for allegedly tapping into Federal Reserve computer to
obtain secret data about nation's money supply while working for E.F. Hutton &
Co.); McQuiston, 2 Accused of Stealing Time on a School's Computer, N.Y. Times,
Feb. 15, 1981, at 55, col. 1 (New York District Attorney's office charged two former
directors of The New York Institute of Technology's Computer Department with
illegally using school's computer in data storage scheme, which netted them over
$40,000, and used more than $200,000 worth of time on college's computer to
operate scheme).
20. See SOKOLIK, supra note 2, at 358; see also The Spreading Danger of Com-
puter Crime, Bus. WEEK, Apr. 20, 1981, at 86 ("the spellbinding advance of the
computer age is also creating . . . a vastly expanded potential for computer crime").
Furthermore, very few computer crime cases are reported in formal court opinions;
most of the cases are reported only in the newspaper. See [1972-1979 Transfer
Binder] 6 COMPUTER L. SEiv. § 5-6 (R. Bigelow ed.).
21. Legal scholars on computer crime believe there are many more cases of
computer abuse that have been detected than have been formally reported or prose-
cuted. The reluctance to report such crime can be attributed to fear that publicity
will cause substantial embarrassment to banks, businesses, and financial institutions,
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justice system needs guidance through specific computer crime legisla-
tion.2 2 Some commentators, however, argue that the present criminal
laws are sufficient to combat computer abuse.2 3
This note examines the rapid increase in computer crime and con-
cludes that traditional federal and state criminal codes are ineffective
in the prosecution of such crime.2 4 It analyzes both the need for
legislation at the federal level and the pending federal computer crime
bill. 25 Existing and proposed state computer crime statutes are also
examined. 2 Current criminal statutes in most states, as well as the
federal statutes, are inadequate.2 7 Amendment of existing computer
crime statutes would be adequate to combat computer abuse in some
states. 28 New laws are required, however, in the states without com-
puter crime statutes, as well as on the federal level. 29
which build reputations on their ability to rely on technological competence. See
generally Raysman & Brown, Evolving Statutes on Computer Crime, N.Y.L.J., Jan.
11, 1983, at 2, col. 1; D. PARKER, CRIME BY COMPUTER 16 (1976); Beware: Hackers at
Play, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 5, 1983, at 42, 46.
22. See LEGISLATIVE RESOURCE MANUAL, supra note 1, at iii (criminal justice
practitioners agree that guidance is needed concerning approach to computer crime
investigations and prosecutions); Laws in U.S. Called Inadequate to Block Abuse of
Computers, N.Y. Times, Sept. 18, 1983, at 1, col. 1 (prosecution of computer
criminals is hindered because of lack of precise legislation); Burnham, Laws to Bar
Computer Misuse Remain Scarce, N.Y. Times, Sept. 8, 1982, at 1, col. 4. See also
Raysman & Brown, Evolving Statutes on Computer Crime, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 11, 1983,
at 2, col. 4 (prompt need for computer crime legislation).
23. See Taber, On Computer Crime (Senate Bill S. 240), 1 COMPUTER L.J. 517,
525 (1979) (crimes committed with computer involvement are already adequately
covered by existing laws) [hereinafter cited as Taber]; see also infra note 79 for
discussion of view that computer crime is sufficiently covered by traditional criminal
laws.
24. Prosecuting the computer criminal presents special problems because the
prosecutor is forced to base his charge on traditional legal theories that did not
anticipate the technical aspects of computerization. See Hearings, supra note 6, at 11
(statement of Senator Ribicoff).
25. See infra note 72 for a discussion of this bill; see infra notes 58-62 for an
analysis of the need for federal legislation.
26. See infra text accompanying notes 111, 112.
27. Presently, there is no federal computer crime statute. See infra text accompa-
nying note 32. Nineteen states have computer crime provisions in their penal laws,
leaving thirty-one states with no computer crime statutes. See infra note 91 and
accompanying text for a list of state computer crime statutes. Of the enacted state
computer crime statutes, none has been embraced by -commentators as an ideal
"model approach" to computer crime.
28. The nineteen states with computer crime statutes could amend their penal
codes to conform with a consensus computer crime approach.
29. See supra note 27.
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II. The Federal Level
A. Existing Federal Laws
Computer technology has changed the form and means by which
traditional crimes may be perpetrated. 30 Moreover, it has created a
new type of criminal conduct which the present federal criminal code
has been unable to adequately curb. 31 Since no federal statute specifi-
cally addresses the use of computers for criminal purposes, 32 a federal
prosecutor must charge and seek conviction under one of the nearly
forty potentially applicable federal statutes. 33 However, none of these
30. Prior to the advent of computers, theft or embezzlement from banks or
financial institutions required a physical taking of tangible property. Today the same
result may be accomplished by a simple telephone hook-up to the institution's com-
puter. Similarly, computers have facilitated easy access to data and statistical infor-
mation now stored in computers. See, e.g., Beware: Hackers at Play, NEwswEEK,
Sept. 5, 1983, at 42. The FBI recently uncovered a Milwaukee-based group of
children, who call themselves the "414s", who gained unauthorized access to over
sixty business and government computer systems purely for fun. Id. at 46. Although
charges were dropped against all involved, it was noted that prosecution under
present criminal statutes would have been difficult because the prosecutor would
need to prove criminal intent on the part of these "joyriding" children. Id.
31. See COMPUTER CRIME, supra note 13, at 131. Although computer crime is the
same in name as other familiar types of crime, including fraud, larceny, embezzle-
ment, theft, vandalism, burglary, extortion, and conspiracy, it differs significantly in
application from traditional crimes in that computer loss may involve an intangible
that is difficult to value or classify as property, which may be required by existing
criminal statutes. Id. at vi; see also Nycum, The Criminal Law Aspects of Computer
Abuse: Part II: Federal Criminal Code, 5 RUTGERS J. COMPUTERS & L. 297 (1976)
(extensive discussion of existing criminal statutes as they may be applied to computer
abuse). See generally Laws in U.S. Called Inadequate to Block Abuse of Computers,
N.Y. Times, Sept. 18, 1983, at 1, col. 1 (lack of local and federal laws specifically
applicable to computer crime is primary reason why few perpetrators are ever
prosecuted for computer abuse).
32. While presently there is no federal legislation specifically aimed at computer
crime, a proposed bill would make some computer abuse a federal crime. See infra
note 73 and accompanying text.
33. See Hearings on S. 240; The Federal Computer Systems Protection Act of
1979 Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice of the Senate Judiciary Comm., 96th
Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 15 (1980) (statement of J.D. McFarlane) (approximately forty
federal statutes could be applicable to control computer crime); see also Nycum, The
Criminal Law Aspects of Computer Abuse: Part II: Federal Criminal Code, 5
RUTGERS J. COMPUTERS & L. 297, 305-22 (1976) for a comprehensive list and discus-
sion of federal statutes applicable to computer crime and a division of the federal
statutes into seven broad categories: (1) theft and related crimes, (2) abuse of federal
channels of communication, (3) national security offenses, (4) trespass and burglary,
(5) deceptive practices, (6) malicious mischief and related offenses, and (7) miscella-
neous other statutes. All forty potentially applicable statutes are embodied in Title 18
U.S.C. §§ 1-6005 (1976).
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statutes was designed originally to control computer-related criminal
activity.3 4 When seeking a conviction, the prosecutor must analyze the
computer-assisted offense and attempt to "shoe-horn" the case into the
most applicable existing federal statute.3 5 Such an approach has sub-
stantial procedural and substantive difficulties.36
Only a handful of the nearly forty potentially applicable federal
statutes actually have been used to prosecute computer abuse.37 The
more frequently applied statutes are the federal wire fraud statute, 38
the federal mail fraud statute, 39 the transportation of stolen property
34. See supra note 24 and accompanying text for discussion of difficulties inher-
ent in prosecuting computer criminals under traditional statutes.
35. See SOKOLIK, supra note 2, at 373; see also Computer Crime, 19 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 499, 508 (1981) (discusses difficulties prosecutors face in trying to match specific
computer crimes with existing criminal laws).
36. Id. at 507-08. The absence of specific state or federal legislation defining
computer crime hampers the prosecutors' ability to prosecute; the impediments that
computerization pose hinge on the prosecutors' inability to draft accusatory pleadings
which identify a statutory prohibition with the conduct in question. See generally
Becker, The Trial of a Computer Crime, 2 COMPUTER L.J. 441, 445 (1980); Ingra-
ham, On Charging Computer Crime, 2 COMPUTER L.J. 429, 430 (1980); Laws in
U.S. Called Inadequate to Block Abuse of Computers, N.Y. Times, Sept. 18, 1983, at
1, col. 1.
37. Although there are forty provisions in the federal criminal code under which
the prosecution of computer criminals is arguably possible, certain provisions have
been utilized more frequently, with varying success. See VOLGYES, supra note 4, at
396-97 (lists the most adequate sections); see also supra note 33.
38. See 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (1976). The statute provides:
Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice
to defraud, or for obtaining money or property by means of false or
fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises, transmits or causes to
be transmitted by means of wire, radio, or television communications in
interstate or foreign commerce, any writings, signs, signals, pictures, or
sounds for the purpose of executing such scheme or artifice, shall be fined
not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.
39. See 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1976). The statute provides:
Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice
to defraud, or for obtaining money or property by means of false or
fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises, or to sell, dispose of,
loan, exchange, alter, give away, distribute, supply, or furnish or procure
for unlawful use any counterfeit or spurious coin, obligation, security, or
other article, or anything represented to be or intimated or held out to be
such counterfeit or spurious article, for the purpose of executing such
scheme or artifice or attempting so to do, places in any post office or
authorized depository for mail matter, any matter or thing whatever to be
sent or delivered by the Postal Service, or takes or receives therefrom, any
such matter or thing, or knowingly causes to be delivered by mail accord-
ing to the direction thereon, or at the place at which it is directed to be
delivered by the person to whom it is addressed, any such matter or thing,
shall be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not more than five
years, or both.
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statute,40 and the theft and related offenses statute. 4 ' Analysis of case
law illustrates that each of these statutes is ineffective as a prosecuto-
rial device for computer crimes. 42
The federal wire fraud statute 43 requires execution of a scheme to
defraud through the misuse of interstate communication devices. 44
40. See 18 U.S.C. § 2314 (1976). The statute provides:
Whoever transports in interstate or foreign commerce any goods, wares,
merchandise, securities or money, of the value of $5,000 or more, knowing
the same to have been stolen, converted or taken by fraud; or
Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice
to defraud, or for obtaining money or property by means of false or
fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises, transports or causes to
be transported, or induces any person to travel in, or to be transported in
interstate commerce in the execution or concealment of a scheme or arti-
fice to defraud that person of money or property having a value of $5,000
or more; or
Whoever, with unlawful or fraudulent intent, transports in interstate or
foreign commerce any falsely made, forged, altered, or counterfeited
securities or tax stamps, knowing the same to have been falsely made,
forged, altered, or counterfeited; or
Whoever, with unlawful or fraudulent intent, transports in interstate or
foreign commerce any traveler's check bearing a forged counter-signature;
or
Whoever, with unlawful or fraudulent intent, transports in interstate or
foreign commerce, any tool, implement, or thing used or fitted to be used
in falsely making, forging, altering, or counterfeiting any security or tax
stamps, or any part thereof-
Shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than ten
years, or both.
This section shall not apply to any falsely made, forged, altered, coun-
terfeited or spurious representation of an obligation or other security of the
United States, or of an obligation, bond, certificate, security, treasury
note, bill, promise to pay or bank note issued by any foreign government
or by a bank or corporation of any foreign country.
41. See 18 U.S.C. § 641 (1976). The statute provides:
Whoever embezzles, steals, purloins, or knowingly converts to his use or
the use of another, or without authority, sells, conveys or disposes of any
record, voucher, money, or thing of value of the United States or of any
department or agency thereof, or any property made or being made under
contract for the United States or any department or agency thereof; or
Whoever receives, conceals, or retains the same with intent to convert it
to his use or gain, knowing it to have been embezzled, stolen, purloined or
converted-
Shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than ten
years, or both; but if the value of such property does not exceed the sum of
$100, he shall be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not more than
one year, or both.
The word "value" means face, par, or market value, or cost price, either
wholesale or retail, whichever is greater.
42. See infra notes 48, 52, 53, 57, 59 and accompanying text.
43. See supra note 38.
44. See United States v. Condolon, 600 F.2d 7 (4th Cir. 1979) (successful prose-
cution of wire fraud depends on misuse of interstate communication facilities to
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This statute has been utilized to prosecute computer criminals by
expanding the definition of "property" to include computer impulses
moving across interstate wires. 45 Case law indicates that the nature of
computers causes problems when the statute is applied to computer
crime.4" The court must broadly construe the statutory requisites 47 in
order to encompass computer offenses.48
execute any scheme or artifice to defraud); United States v. Cowart, 595 F.2d 1023
(5th Cir. 1979) (Government, in obtaining wire fraud conviction, must prove use of
interstate communications and criminal intent to defraud); United States v. Louder-
man, 576 F.2d 1383 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 896 (1978) (for successful
prosecution, Government need not prove success of scheme nor that loss occurred; it
need only prove there existed a scheme to defraud and use of interstate communica-
tions); United States v. Corey, 566 F.2d 429 (2d Cir. 1977) (Government need only
show that defendant participated in a scheme to defraud and that interstate wires
were used to further the scheme); United States v. O'Malley, 535 F.2d 589 (10th
Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 960 (1976) (in a prosecution under this section, the
Government need not prove success of scheme or that intended victim suffered loss; it
need only prove use of interstate communications in furtherance of a scheme to
defraud); United States v. Houlihan, 332 F.2d 8 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 828
(1964) (crime of fraud by wire complete where there is unlawful scheme and use of
interstate or foreign telephonic, telegraphic, or electronic means of effectuating
scheme).
45. See White-Collar Crime: Computer Crime, 18 AM. CiuM. L. REV. 370, 374-
78 (1980).
46. See infra note 48 and accompanying text for extensive discussion of case law
illustrating the difficulties.
47. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
48. See United States v. Giovengo, 637 F.2d 941, 945 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied
sub nom., Paladino v. United States, 450 U.S. 1032 (1981), in which the defendants,
two customer service agents for an airline at the Greater Pittsburgh Airport, devised
a scheme whereby they defrauded their employer of cash paid by passengers for one-
way airline tickets. Id. at 942. The Third Circuit, broadly interpreting the wire
fraud statute, upheld the defendants' conviction, finding that the statute covered
wire impulses generated by the airline's main computer in Kansas City, Missouri,
'which were then used to imprint tickets at the Pittsburgh airport. Id. at 944-45. In
applying the wire fraud statute to this computer offense, the court relied heavily on
the fact that these tickets were essential to the execution of the fraudulent scheme. Id.
at 945. See also United States v. Alston, 609 F.2d 531 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert. denied,
445 U.S. 918 (1980). There the defendant was found guilty of having executed a
scheme to defraud whereby he was paid to have an accomplice falsify computerized
credit records of individuals who had difficulty obtaining credit. Id. at 533. The
altered credit records were then sent for approval to various lending institutions,
ultimately allowing these individuals to obtain credit to purchase automobiles and
other items. Id. Although the scheme involved computer tampering, the circuit court
affirmed the district court's liberal construction of the wire fraud statute to encom-
pass defendant's actions. Id. at 538. In United States v. Seidlitz, 589 F.2d 152 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 922 (1978), the defendant, who operated his own
computer business in Virginia, gained unauthorized access to his former employer's
computer located in Maryland. The defendant obtained the computer program via
electronic signals over interstate telephone lines connected to his Virginia office. Id.
at 154-55. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the conviction of defendant, finding suffi-
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The federal mail fraud statute 4 also has been utilized with some
success in cases involving computer crime.50 Application of this statute
requires fulfillment of two statutory requisites: (1) a scheme to de-
fraud, and (2) a mailing for the purpose of executing the scheme. 5 1
The mail fraud statute requires a broad interpretation of what consti-
tutes a mailing to enable the prosecution of computer crime.52 More-
over, some courts have had difficulty applying this statute to com-
puter criminals where the facts of a particular case failed to meet the
statutory requisites . 5 3
Under the transportation of stolen property statute, it is illegal to
transport stolen goods, securities, property worth $5,000, or cash in
that amount across state lines. 54 Prosecutors have faced procedural
cient evidence to deem that the transmission of electronic signals across state lines
constitutes the transportation of "property" within the meaning of the federal wire
fraud statute. Id. at 160. The prosecutor's success in Seidlitz rested on the fact that
the defendant had telephoned the computer in Maryland from his home in Virginia.
If the defendant had not transmitted the programs across state lines, the wire fraud
statute would have been inapplicable.
49. See supra note 39.
50. See Computer Crime, 19 AM. CRiM. L. REV. 499, 501 (1981).
51. See United States v. White, 673 F.2d 299, 302 (10th Cir. 1982) (essential
elements of mail fraud are (1) existence of scheme to defraud and (2) utilization of
mails in furtherance of the scheme); United States v. Melton, 689 F.2d 679, 684 (7th
Cir. 1982) (to prove violation of mail fraud statutes, victim need not actually be
defrauded or suffer loss); United States v. Hasenstab, 575 F.2d 1035, 1039 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 827 (1978) (for successful prosecution under this statute, it is
enough to prove that a scheme to defraud existed and that it was foreseeable that the
scheme would utilize the mails); United States v. Baren, 305 F.2d 527, 528 (2d Cir.
1962) (the two necessary elements for violation of this section are (1) formation of a
scheme with intent to defraud, and (2) use of mails in furtherance of that scheme).
52. See United States v. Kelly, 507 F. Supp. 495 (E.D. Pa. 1981), in which the
defendants organized a computerized sheet music arranging and engraving company
through the unauthorized use of their employer's computer. In addition, they used
the mails to distribute brochures describing their business scheme. Id. at 497. Their
fatal mistake, however, was in failing to state in the brochure that they were using
their employer's computer to execute the business. The court, reading the mail fraud
statute very broadly, convicted the defendants. Id. at 508-09. Had the defendants
given credit to their employer, prosecution under the mail fraud statute would have
been futile. Whether the defendants could have been successfully prosecuted for their
computer abuse is at best an uncertainty. See also United States v. Curtis, 537 F.2d
1091 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 962 (1976) (defendant devised scheme
involving computerized dating; court held there was substantial evidence in record to
establish elements of mail fraud and conviction was upheld).
53. See United States v. Computer Sciences Corp., 511 F. Supp. 1125 (E.D. Va.
1981), rev'd, 689 F.2d 1181 (4th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 729 (1983)
(Fourth Circuit determined that dismissal of wire fraud and mail fraud charges was
error, reasoning that district court's application of statutes' scope was too narrow).
54. See supra note 40 for statute.
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and substantive problems when applying this statute to computer
offenses. 55 One court declared the statute inapposite since the com-
puter misappropriation did not entail a physical transportation be-
tween two states.56 Another court offered strained reasoning in order
to bring the defendant within the purview of the statute. 57
The theft and related offenses statute prohibits embezzlement,
theft, unauthorized conversion, sale or disposition of federal prop-
erty.5 8 The ineffectiveness of current federal statutes in dealing with
computer offenses is illustrated by application of this statute. Al-
though courts have found the statute applicable to the theft of com-
55. See infra notes 56 & 57 for case law illustrating the difficulties. See also
White-Collar Crime: Computer Crime, 18 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 370, 376 (1980)
(application of transportation of stolen property statute to computer crime raises
several problems).
56. In United States v. Seidlitz, supra note 48, the defendant was charged with
intent to defraud through the use of interstate wires and with interstate transporta-
tion of stolen property. The trial court dismissed the latter charge and the Fourth
Circuit affirmed. 589 F.2d at 155, n.12. The district court found that the programs
Seidlitz misappropriated via electronic impulses over telephone lines were not really
carried off because they were still within the computer. Seidlitz had merely repro-
duced them via a remote terminal. The logical inference from the court's decision is
that, for successful prosecution of a computer crime under this statute, actual physi-
cal transportation of the original property across a state line is needed.
57. See United States v. Jones, 553 F.2d 351 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S.
968 (1977), in which defendant fraudulently obtained and cashed checks payable to
herself. Defendant employed someone to alter accounts payable data entered into the
computer of his employer, a Canadian subsidiary of Whirlpool Corp. As a result of
this entered data, false accounts payable documents were set up in the defendant's
name, and the computer printed checks with facsimile signatures payable to the
defendant, which should have been payable to Whirlpool. Defendant was charged
with the interstate transportation of fraudulently obtained checks. Id. at 352-54. The
district court dismissed the indictment on the grounds that the checks were forgeries
and therefore did not violate the statute under which defendant was charged. 414 F.
Supp. 964, 967 (D. Md. 1976). The Fourth Circuit reversed, concluding that the
issuance of the checks by computer constituted an act of fraud rather than forgery,
and thus fell within the statute. 553 F.2d at 355-56. Accordingly, it has been
recognized that if indeed the checks had been found to be forgeries and the indict-
ment dismissed, there would probably have been no federal statute under which to
charge the defendant. See Gemignani, Computer Crime: The Law in '80, 13 INn. L.
REV., 681, 705 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Gemignani].
58. See supra note 41 for statute. See generally United States v. Evans, 572 F.2d
455 (5th Cir.), reh'g denied, 576 F.2d 931, cert. denied, 439 U.S. 870 (1978) (for
successful prosecution under this statute, the Government must prove embezzling or
stealing public money, property, or records, and that it resulted in some actual
property loss); United States v. Trcinski, 553 F.2d 851 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied,
431 U.S. 919 (1977) (receipt of stolen goods requ'ires actual carrying away); United
States v. Fleetwood, 489 F. Supp. 129 (D. Or. 1980) (for prosecution for embezzle-
ment of savings bonds under this section, Government must show presence of control
sufficient to establish federal interest over property seized).
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puter time, computer programs, and computer printouts, 59 successful
prosecution of a computer crime utilizing this statute hinges on how
liberally the court will interpret the statutory requisites. 60
The case law discussed above demonstrates that the absence of a
precise statute to combat computer crime can jeopardize the prosecu-
tion of criminal activity involving such sophisticated technology. 6'
The federal prosecutor must seek conviction under statutes that were
not designed to include computer crimes.6 2 The outcome of the prose-
cution is then subject to the court's application of statutory requisites
to computer abuse. 63 If the court fails to, construe the statute liberally
there will be instances where no federal criminal sanctions exist for
59. See United States v. Girard, 601 F.2d 69 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 871
(1979). In Girard, the defendants were charged and convicted under the theft and
related offenses statute for the unauthorized conversion and sale of computerized
Drug Enforcement Administration files. The Second Circuit upheld the conviction,
interpreting the statute to include intangibles such as computer programs, computer
time and computer printouts. Id. at 70-71. See also United States v. Sampson, [1978]
6 COMPUTER L. SERv. REP. 879 (CCH) (N.D. Cal. 1978), where the defendant was
charged under the same statute. The defendant, a former NASA contractor, obtained
unauthorized use of a United States government computer through his home tele-
phone. The unauthorized use was discovered and, based upon defendant's statement
that he used the computer for an average of six hours per week for thirty-two weeks,
$1,924 was calculated as the amount of computer time he had stolen. Id. Defendant
moved the district court to dismiss the indictment on the ground that it failed to state
a criminal offense, arguing that computer time and storage capacity were not capa-
ble of being construed as property. Id. at 880. The district court denied the motion,
finding that computer time and use of its storage capacities were "things of value."
Id. at 881.
60. See Computer Crime, 19 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 499, 502 (1981) ("[t]he value of
section 641 as a prosecutorial tool in computer related cases depends on whether a
judge will interpret 'things of value' and 'property' broadly enough to include com-
puter time and storage capacity"). See, e.g., United States v. Lambert, 446 F. Supp.
890 (D. Conn. 1978) (defendants were charged under 18 U.S.C. § 641 for selling
confidential information obtained from a computer within the Drug Enforcement
Admistration). In Lambert, only the information, not the documents containing the
information, was transferred. The defendants moved to dismiss, claiming that § 641
only applied to tangible items. The court denied the motion, holding that the statute
is not restricted to the theft of tangible property and that the computerized records
were "things of value" within the meaning of the statute. Id. at 895.
61. See generally, VOLGYES, supra note 4, at 398 (discusses result where there is
lack of adequate statutes upon which to attack computer abuse).
62. See supra note 24; see generally, Computer Crime, 19 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
499, 506 (1981) (since computer crime offenses are charged under statutes not de-
signed for computer use, failure to meet statutory requisites may result in acquittal).
63. See RODDY, supra note 2, at 356-57 ("[w]hen a statute is not specifically
applicable, the decision to prosecute may be abrogated; when not abrogated, the
court may feel constrained to find that the criminal activity is not within the reach of
the law").
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computer crime.6 4 To remedy this deficiency, legislation prescribing
penalties for illegal computer use should be enacted. Such legislation
should be drafted to sufficiently define the wrongful activity,65 deter
future computer crime,66 add certainty6 7 and uniformity to these
prosecutions,6 8 and encourage reporting of such crime.
6 9
B. Proposed Federal Legislation
Although no current federal statute specifically addresses computer
crime, significant progress has occurred toward the enactment of such
legislation. For several years, Congress has been considering The Pro-
posed Federal Computer Systems Protection Act, which provides fines
and imprisonment for violations. 70 This legislation was proposed in
64. See Gemignani supra note 57, at 706 for discussion of case where court had
difficulty applying existing criminal laws to computer offense. See generally RODDY,
supra note 2, at 352 (applicability of existing criminal statutes depends in large part
on the particular circumstances of the crime; without statutory requisites fitting the
particular circumstances, defendant may go free).
65. In order that wrongful computer abuse be sufficiently defined, effective
federal legislation needs to specifically state the type of property it encompasses and
to narrowly define the scope of the term "computer" as used within the legislation.
See infra note 83 for a detailed discussion of the definition of the term "property" in
the pending federal computer crime legislation. See infra note 78 for a discussion of
the definition of the term "computer" in the pending federal bill.
66. Once computer crime legislation is enacted, many potential computer crimi-
nals will become aware of its existence and the Government's recognition of the
wrongful activity, thus creating a deterrent effect. See Hearings, supra note 6, at 29;
see also infra note 89 and accompanying text.
67. See generally COMPUTER CRIME, supra note 13, at 129; Hearings, supra note
6, at 11 (statement of Senator Ribicoff). Because of the lack of precise federal
legislation, uncertainty surrounds the prosecution of a computer offense in that the
prosecutor is forced to apply a statute written without computers in mind and to
convince the court that all statutory requisites have been met. See also supra note 36
(discussion of difficulties prosecutors have in seeking conviction of a computer crime
under existing penal laws).
68. Since computer crime is currently prosecuted under various federal statutes,
it is subject to each statute's penalty limitations, which can result in an inappropriate
punishment. See generally VOLGYES, supra note 4, at 400; see also infra note 85 and
accompanying text.
69. See generally SOKOLIK, supra note 2, at 374 (an important benefit of com-
puter crime legislation is that it will "encourage those who discover computer crimes
to report and to cooperate in the prosecution of the perpetrators"). See also infra text
accompanying note 159.
70. See COMPUTER CRIME AND SECURITY, supra note 12, at 4 (discusses history of
con'gressional activity with respect to computer crime legislation). In 1977, Senator
Ribicoff introduced S. 1766, The Federal Computer Systems Protection Act, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess., 123 CONG. REC. 20, 953 (1977) [hereinafter cited as S. 1766]. An
identical bill, H.R. 8421, was introduced in the House by Representative Rose and
was referred to the Committee on the Judiciary. H.R. 8421 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123
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response to the deficiencies of existing laws, which do not contemplate
computer abuse and cannot be effectively interpreted to accommo-
date this new form of illegal conduct.71 Currently, H.R. 1092, The
Federal Computer Systems Protection Act of 198372 is currently pend-
ing before Congress.7 3 The bill proposes "[tio amend Title 18, United
CONG. REc. 23,720 (1977). Hearings were held on S. 1766 before the Senate Commit-
tee on the Judiciary Subcommittee on Criminal Laws and Procedures. Federal
Computer Systems Protection Act: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Laws
and Procedure, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1978). The bill was never voted on by either
branch of Congress. Senator Ribicoff reintroduced the bill in the 96th Congress as S.
240, The Federal Computer Systems Protection Act of 1979. 96th Cong., 1st Sess.,
125 CONG. REC. 1190 (1979) [hereinafter cited as S. 240]. An identical bill, H.R.
6192, was introduced in the House by Representative Bill Nelson. 96th Cong., 1st
Sess., 125 CONG. REC. 36,991 (1979). The Criminal Justice Subcommittee of the
Senate Judiciary Committee held further hearings on S. 240. See The Federal Com-
puter Systems Protection Act of 1979 Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice of the
Senate Judiciary Comm., 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1980). For extensive discussion of S.
240 see generally RoDDY, supra note 2, at 349-52; Krieger, Current and Proposed
Computer Crime Legislation, 2 COMPUTER L. J. 721, 724-27 (1980); Taber, supra
note 23, at 517. These computer crime bills received no further action in the 96th
Congress. When Senator Ribicoff retired in 1981, Representative Bill Nelson became
the major force behind computer crime legislation. In the 97th Congress, Representa-
tive Nelson introduced H.R. 3970, The Federal Computer Systems Protection Act of
1981, which was referred to the House Judiciary Committee but received no further
action. 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG. REC. H3141 (daily ed. June 18, 1981). The
97th Congress also considered two other bills dealing with the safeguarding of
computer information, H.R. 6420, Computer Software Piracy and Counterfeiting,
97th Cong., 2d Sess., 128 CONG. REC. H2359 (daily ed. May 19, 1982) (the bill's
intent was to protect computer programs from duplication and illegal use), and H.R.
6006, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., 128 CONG. REc. H1341 (daily ed. March 31, 1982)
(purpose of bill was to deal with computer security standards).
71. See COMPUTER CRIME, supra note 13, at 131.
72. The Proposed Federal Computer Systems Protection Act of 1983, H.R. 1092,
98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 CONG. REC. H219 (daily ed. Jan. 31, 1983) [hereinafter
cited as H.R. 1092].
73. H.R. 1092 is currently pending in the Civil and Constitutional Rights Sub-
committee of the House Judiciary Committee. Telephone interview with Jim
Southerland, Legislative Aide to Rep. Nelson (July 12, 1983). This Subcommittee
held hearings on computer crime in September 1982, and anticipates further hearings
on computer crime in 1983. Comments by Chairman Don Edwards (D. Cal.),
reprinted in, COMPUTER CRIME AND SECURITY, supra note 12, at 5 (as of the date of
this publication, the Hearing report had not been issued). Favorable House action is
expected on H.R. 1092 this year. Telephone interview with Jim Southerland, Legisla-
tive Aide to Rep. Nelson (July 12, 1983). In addition, an identical bill, S. 1733, has
been introduced in the Senate by Senator Paul Trible (R. Va.). Telephone interview
with Stephanie Sears, Legislative Aide to Rep. Nelson (Aug. 25, 1983).
In addition to H.R. 1092, two other bills aimed at protecting computer use and
security were introduced in the 98th Congress. See Small Business Computer Crime
Prevention Act, H.R. 3075, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 CONG. REc. H3144 (daily ed.
May 19, 1983) (bill's intent is to encourage small businesses to protect their computer
technology from criminal infiltration); Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of 1983,
1984]'
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States Code, to make a crime the use, for fraudulent or other illegal
purposes, of any computer owned or operated by the United States,
certain financial institutions, and entities affecting interstate com-
merce." 74
H.R. 1092 consists of a preamble and four sections.75 The preamble
states that computer-related crime is a growing problem in both the
government and private sector. In addition, such crimes are identified
as being costly to the public. Many opportunities exist to commit these
crimes, and prosecution under existing criminal statutes is difficult. 6
The purpose of this bill is to remedy the inadequacies in the present
criminal code by proscribing as illegal certain computer conduct, such
as (1) the introduction of fraudulent records into the computer system;
(2) the unauthorized use of computer data; (3) the alteration or de-
H.R. 1028, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 CONG. REC. H201 (daily ed. Jan. 27, 1983)
(intent of bill is to protect semiconductor chips and masks against unauthorized
duplication).
74. See H.R. 1092, supra note 72, at H219. H.R. 1092 describes the proscribed
acts as follows: Subsection (a) of the bill defines as illegal any attempt to use a
computer for fraudulent purposes or to embezzle, steal or knowingly convert an-
other's property; penalties for violating section (a) are a fine of not more than two
times the amount stolen or $50,000, whichever is higher, or not more than five years
imprisonment, or both; Subsection (b) prohibits intentional, unauthorized damage,
use, or alteration of a computer, computer programs, or stored information; the
penalties for violating section (b), are a $50,000 fine or imprisonment of not more
than five years, or both. In addition, Subsection (c) defines frequently used computer
terminology, and Subsection (d) states that in a situation where federal jurisdiction
exists concurrently with state or local jurisdiction, the existence of federal jurisdiction
alone does not require its exercise. Although H.R. 1092 emphasizes federal computer
systems in its title, its coverage goes beyond federal agency computers to those of
financial institutions whose security is guaranteed by the federal government and to
computer networks operating in interstate commerce or using interstate facilities. See
NEWS RELEASE, supra note 2.
75. See H.R. 1092, supra note 72, at H219-20.
76. Id. at 219. The preamble to H.R. 1092 specifically states:
(1) computer-related crime is a growing problem in the Government and
in the private sector; (2) such crime occurs at great cost to the public since
losses for each incident of computer crime tend to be far greater than the
losses associated with each incident of other white collar crime; (3) the
opportunities for computer-related crimes in Federal programs, in finan-
cial institutions, and in computers which operate in or use a facility of
interstate commerce through the introduction of fraudulent records into a
computer system, unauthorized use of computer facilities, alteration or
destruction of computerized information files, and stealing of financial
instruments, data, or other assets, are great; (4) computer-related crime
directed at computers which operate in or use a facility of interstate
commerce has a direct effect on interstate commerce; and (5) the prosecu-
tion of persons engaged in computer-related crime is difficult under cur-
rent Federal criminal statutes.
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struction of stored computer data; and (4) the theft of financial instru-
ments, data, or other assets. 77
H.R. 1092 has the same title as previously proposed legislation 7
that was heavily criticized as unnecessary, 79 overbroad,8 0 and contain-
ing excessive punishments.8 1 The 1983 statute, however, has been
extensively revised. 82 These revisions consist of rewording the defini-
tion of "computer" to provide a clearer statement of what constitutes
wrongful activity within the context of the statute,8 3 deletion of un-
77. See H.R. 1092, supra note 72 at H219. These categories are similar to the
four types of computer crime discussed earlier. See supra note 76 for discussion of the
four categories. See also supra notes 15-19 and accompanying text for specific exam-
ples of what type of activity is included in these categories.
78. See supra note 70.
79. See Taber, supra note 23, at 525-30. Taber claims that use of a computer
does not create a unique crime, and that, thus, such crime is already adequately
covered by existing criminal laws. Id. at 525. The validity of this proposition is
doubtful. Taber fails to recognize the impact computer technology has had on
traditional criminal statutes. These statutes are not easily adaptable to computer use
because of the intangible aspects at the very center of computerization. Unauthorized
computer use, misappropriation of computer programs, misuse of stored data, and
computer time were clearly not anticipated when existing criminal statutes were
drafted. The inability of present criminal laws to effectively curb computer crime is
apparent. See supra note 36. Taber further argues that computer crime is not
difficult to prosecute, noting that prosecutors have been able to obtain convictions
under traditional criminal laws. Taber, supra note 23, at 528. To the contrary,
although some prosecutions of computer abusers have been successful, they have not
been easily secured by federal prosecutors. See supra notes 61-64. Absence of specific
legislation has hampered the prosecutors' ability to prosecute. The need for precise
legislation is obvious in order to avoid the possibility that the guilty may evade
justice.
80. The criticism with respect to overbroadness was two-fold. First, it focused on
the extremely general definition of "computer" as the statute was originally drafted,
including computers used for personal, family, and household purposes. Second, it
criticized the statutes' language as ambiguous with respect to precisely what actions
it proscribed as wrongful computer use. See generally GEMIGNANI, supra note 57, at
709; RODDY, supra note 2, at 360-61.
81. Previously proposed bills were criticized for providing stiffer penalties and
fines than the violations warranted. See generally Hearings, supra note 6, at 92-93;
Computer Crime, 19 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 499, 505 (1981). Earlier bills provided for
up to fifteen years imprisonment and fines of up to $50,000 for any computer
violation; these penalties appear not to be directly proportional to the criminal
activity. See S. 1766 and S. 240, supra note 70 ("whoever intentionally without
authorization . . . attempts to damage or destroy any computer, . . . shall be fined
not more than $50,000 or imprisoned not more than fifteen years, or both").
82. See NEWS RELEASE, supra note 2.
83. See H.R. 1092, supra note 72, at H219. In H.R. 1092, subsection 3(a),
computer is defined as:
[a]n electronic, magnetic, optical, hydraulic, organic or other high speed
data processing device or system performing logical, arithmetic, or storage
functions, and includes any property, data storage facility, or communica-
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necessary computer jargon,84 reduction in the prescribed penalties, 85
and the addition of a section giving the federal government concur-
rent jurisdiction with the states. 8
Enactment of H.R. 1092 will have significant beneficial effects. It
remedies the problems associated with the prosecution of computer
crime cases by providing a specific statute under which to charge and
seek conviction of a computer criminal. 87 The precisely worded defini-
tions relieve uncertainty surrounding a court's determination of
whether computer-related intangibles fall within the meaning of exist-
ing criminal statutes. 88 In addition, enactment of such legislation will
tions facility directly related to or operating in conjunction with such
device or system; but does not include an automated typewriter or typeset-
ter, a portable hand-held calculator, or any computer designed and manu-
factured for, and which is used exclusively for, routine personal, family,
or household purposes and which is not used to access, to communicate
with, or to manipulate any other computer.
Compare this precise definition with the general definition of "computer" contained
in S. 240, supra note 70.
'[C]omputer' means an electronic device which performs logical,
arithmetic, and memory functions by the manipulation of electronic or
magnetic impulses, and includes all input, output, processing, storage,
software, or communication facilities which are connected or related to
such a device in a system or network.
84. The complex list of technological definitions included in earlier bills has been
simplified. Compare the list of definitions in H.R. 1092, supra note 72, at H219-20,
with the list contained in S. 240, supra note 70. For instance, the use of the noun
"access" as a verb has been deleted, as have the terms "computer system," "computer
program," and "computer software."
85. The penalties in previous legislation were clearly excessive and have been
reduced. For penalties provided for in H.R. 1092, see supra note 74 and accompany-
ing text. Drafters of H.R. 1092 appear to have followed the advice of their colleagues
and have adopted penalties in direct relation to the amount of the gain derived,
unlike the arbitrary fines contained in earlier bills. See Hearings, supra note 6, at 92-
3 (statements of Senators Biden, Finney and Rohrbaugh) (Senator Rohrbaugh com-
mented that the fine and prison sentence should be proportional to the amount taken
by computer fraud or theft).
86. See H.R. 1092, supra note 72, at H220 section (d). Absent this provision,
prosecutors utilizing a computer crime bill would have been faced with the difficulty
of federal courts suddenly having jurisdiction over many activities which previously
had been dealt with by the state courts. See generally RODDY, supra note 2, at 363;
Comment, Computer Crime-Senate Bill S. 240, 10 MEM. ST. U.L. REV. 660, 667-68
(1980).
87. See NEws RELEASE, supra note 2; see generally COMPUTER CRIME, supra note
13, at 129; Raysman, Of Computers and the Law, N.Y. Times, Sept. 14, 1980 § 3, at
18, col. 5. See also supra note 36 and accompanying text for a discussion of proce-
dural and substantive problems encountered when seeking conviction of a computer
criminal.
88. See generally RODDY, supra note 2, at 360. The detailed definition of "prop-
erty" in the federal bill will relieve the courts of the difficulty inherent in interpreting
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publicize the scope of illegal conduct and dramatize the punishment
imposed. 9 Public awareness of the new federal computer crime legis-
lation will deter potential abusers and encourage victims of computer
crime and those who discover these crimes to report them immediately
and to seek prosecution of the offender. 0
III. State Level
A. Existing State Legislation
Although several states have enacted specific computer crime legis-
lation,"' the majority continue to rely on traditional state statutory
law to combat computer crime. 2 State prosecutors encounter a degree
of uncertainty, similar to federal prosecutors, as well as procedural
and substantive impediments, when they charge a computer offense
under criminal laws covering traditional offenses. 3 State prosecutors
the existent criminal code to include computer related offenses. "Property," as de-
fined in H.R. 1092, supra note 72, at H219, subsection 3(a), covers "anything of
value, and includes tangible and intangible personal property; information in the
form of computer processed, produced, or stored data, information configured for
use in a computer medium; information being processed, transmitted or stored;
computer operating or applications programs; or services."
89. See Hearings, supra note 6, at 3. In introducing the federal computer crime
bill, Senator Ribicoff stated that such legislation would deter the potential criminal
and at the same time warn other white-collar criminals that their crimes will be dealt
with in the most befitting manner. See also SOKOLIK, supra note 2, at 374.
90. See supra note 69 and accompanying text for a discussion of the benefit of
public awareness of computer crime legislation.
91. See COMPUTER CRIME AND SECURITY, supra note 12, at 11. As of this date,
computer crime legislation has been enacted in nineteen states. See ALASKA STAT. §
11.46.985 (1978); ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-2301, 13-2316 (West 1978 & Supp.
1982-1983); CAL. PENAL CODE § 502 (West Supp. 1983); CoLo. REV. STAT. §§ 18-
5.5101, 102 (Supp. 1982); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 858 (Supp. 1982); FLA. STAT.
ANN. §§ 815.00-07 (West Supp. 1983); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 16-9-90-93 (1982);. ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 15-1, 16-9 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1983-1984); MICH. CoMP. LAWS
ANN. §§ 752.791-.797 (West Supp. 1983-1984); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 609.87-89
(West Supp. 1983); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 569.093-.099 (Vernon Supp. 1983); MONT.
CODE ANN. §§ 45-1-205, 45-2-101, 45-2-103, 45-1-104 (1981); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§
30-16A-1-4 (Supp. 1983); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 14-453-457 (1981); OHIO CODE ANN.
§§ 2901.01, 2913.01 (Page Supp. 1982); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 11-52-1-4. (1981); UTAH
CODE ANN. §§ 76-6-701-704 (Supp. 1981); VA. CODE § 18.2-98.1 (1982); Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 943.70 (West Supp. 1982-1983).
92. See LEGISLATIVE RESOURCE MANUAL, supra note 1, at 1; see also COMPUTER
CRIME, supra note 13, at 129.
93. See generally LEGISLATIVE RESOURCE MANUAL, supra note 1, at 1 (states have
confronted difficulties in applying traditional criminal laws to situations involving
use of computers); VOLCYES, supra note 4, at 400-01; see also infra notes 107, 110 and
accompanying text for case law discussing present difficulty in prosecuting a com-
puter criminal.
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rely on eleven areas of law in computer crime cases. 94 These tradi-
tional areas, which vary widely from state to state, include laws
against arson, 95 burglary,9" embezzlement,9 7 extortion, 8 forgery, 99
larceny, 00 criminal mischief,' 0' receipt of stolen property, 0 2 theft, 0 3
theft of services or labor under false pretenses,10 4 and theft of trade
secrets. 10
5
94. See generally LEGISLATIVE RESOURCE MANUAL, supra note 1, at 1-8; VOLGYES,
supra note 4, at 400 (divides current state laws into ten areas). For a comprehensive
study of existing state laws that may be applicable to combat computer crime, see
Nycum, The Criminal Law Aspects of Computer Abuse: Part I: State Penal Laws, 5
RUTGERS J. OF COMPUTERS & L. 271 (1976).
95. In general, modern arson statutes refer to the malicious burning of a build-
ing. See LECISLATIVE RESOURCE MANUAL, supra note 1, at 1. However, with respect to
computers, arson may be charged where the computer is intentionally set on fire or
where the computer tapes or programs are unlawfully burned. Id.
96. The common law statutory definition of burglary has been liberalized in that
the definitions today require only an entry into any type of structure. See W. LAFAVE
& A. SCOTT, JR., HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW 708 (1972) [hereinafter cited as
LAFAVE]. Prosecution of a computer criminal under such a statute will be useful only
if there was an unlawful entry into a computer facility, not if access had been gained
into the computer data base in order to steal valuable information. See LEGISLATIVE
RESOURCE MANUAL, supra note 1, at 3.
97. In general, embezzlement is defined as the fraudulent conversion of property
belonging to another by one who lawfully possesses it. See LAFAVE, supra note 96, at
645.
98. The crime of extortion is generally charged to punish threats to do bodily
harm, to injure property, to accuse the victim of crime, and to expose "disgraceful
defect or secret of the victim." Id. at 705-06.
99. Forgery statutes may be successfully utilized to prosecute a computer crimi-
nal because the statutes have been modified to include the "making, altering, execut-
ing, completing or authenticating of any seal, signature, writing, or symbol of right,
privilege or identification, that may defraud or injure another." See COMPUTER
CRIME, supra note 13, at 136.
100. The crime of larceny is defined as the trespassory taking and carrying away
of the personal property of another with intent to steal it. See LAFAVE, supra note 96,
at 622. Seeking conviction for a computer crime under a larceny statute may be
difficult depending on the statute's definition of "property" and "thing of value." See
LEGISLATIVE RESOURCE MANUAL, supra note 1, at 3.
101. Criminal mischief is defined as "willful destruction of the property of an-
other." Id. at 2. Since this statute generally requires tangible damage to property,
problems exist in using such a statute to prosecute computer crime. Id.
102. Receipt of stolen property occurs when the receiver knows the property is
stolen and intends to deprive the owner of his property. See LAFAVE, supra note 96,
at 682-83.
103. Theft occurs when one misappropriates the property of another. Id. at 673.
Because the statutes were originally designed with tangible property in mind, they
may be ineffective against a computer offense.
104. Generally, theft under false pretenses occurs when the wrongdoer knows that
he is making a false representation of a material fact and intends to defraud by
causing the victim to pass title to his property to the wrongdoer. Id. at 655.
105. This offense occurs where a secret process or item used in a trade or business
is unlawfully taken. See LEGISLATIVE RESOURCE MANUAL, supra note 1, at 4. Prosecu-
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States have taken varying approaches in applying these statutes to
computer crime. Some state prosecutors seeking conviction for a com-
puter-assisted offense have relied on state courts to interpret existing
criminal laws liberally to include computer crimes.106 This approach
has had limited success. 107 New York State has amended its penal laws
to specifically include certain aspects of computer abuse. 0 Although
tion under this statute depends on fulfillment of the statutory requisites; conse-
quently, since this type of statute requires a physical taking of property, it may be
difficult to convict someone for theft of a computer program or stored data because
of the property's intangibility. See generally COMPUTER CRIME, supra note 13, at 142;
LEGISLATIVE RESOURCE MANUAL, supra note 1, at 4.
106. See Hancock v. Texas, 402 S.W.2d 906 (Tex. Crim. App. 1966), aff'd sub
nom., Hancock v. Decker, 379 F.2d 552 (5th Cir. 1967) (affirmed defendant's felony
conviction for theft of computer programs from employer). The defendant in Han-
cock contended that computer programs were not property within the meaning of
the state statute. 402 S.W.2d at 908. The court rejected this argument and convicted
defendant. Id. at 911. On petition for habeas corpus relief, the federal court held
that the Texas court's construction of the state's theft statute did not violate federal
due process. 379 F.2d at 553. See generally, People v. Gauer, 7 Ill. App.3d 512, 288
N.E.2d 24 (1972) (accuracy and reliability of telephone company's computerized
records of telephone calls became an issue in case remanded for new trial).
107. See Ward v. Superior Court, 3 Comp. L. Serv. Rep. 206 (Cal. Super. Ct.
1972). Defendant Ward, an employee of a computer service company, acquired,
through use of his employer's computer, a computer program belonging to a competi-
tor. Id. Ward transferred the data by directing his employer's computer to transmit
electronic impulses which represented the program. Id. He then had his employer's
computer print the information onto paper. Id. at 207. Ward was charged under
California's theft of trade secret statute. Id. However, the court noted that intangible
magnetic impulses transferred from one computer to another did not constitute a
trade secret absent a tangible copy. Id. at 208. Therefore, the court held that only the
copying of the data was a violation under the statute. Id. Apparently, defendant was
found guilty here solely because he had made copies of the program. See also Lund v.
Commonwealth, 217 Va. 688, 232 S.E.2d 745 (1977) (computer time is not "goods or
chattel" for purposes of Virginia state larceny statute requiring theft of property in
excess of $100).
108. See New York's larceny statute, N.Y. PENAL LAW § 155.00(1) (McKinney
1975), which encompasses computer hardware and software, since it defines "prop-
erty" as "money, personal property ... or any article, substance or thing of value,"
and covers both tangibles and intangibles; New York's anti-tampering statute, N.Y.
PENAL LAW §§ 145.15, 145.20, 145.25 (McKinney 1975), prohibits both tampering
with any property that causes substantial inconvenience, and creating a risk of
substantial damage to property, whether or not the damage actually occurs. Further-
more, part of New York's forgery statute, N.Y. PENAL LAW § 170.00(1)-(7) (McKin-
ney 1975), defines forgeries to include symbols or identification. However, although
New York's Penal Code includes certain categories into which certain computer
related crime can be placed, there are statutes that are unclear in their scope. New
York's theft of services law, N.Y. PENAL LAW § 165.15 (McKinney 1975), covers
goods and services and other tangible things of value, but is unclear as to what degree
intangibles would be covered. See generally New York State Bar Association, LEGIS-
LATION REPORT ON COMPUTER CRIME 4, 16 (Oct. 22, 1982) [hereinafter cited as
LEGISLATION REPORT] (New York's penal law can encompass many aspects of com-
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this approach may appear sufficient, its success depends on the exten-
siveness of the states' penal codes. 109 While state prosecutors some-
times have been effective in obtaining convictions against computer
criminals, neither of these approaches is totally satisfactory."10
B. State Computer Crime Statutes
Several states have demonstrated their concern with protecting
computer systems and preventing computer crime through enactment
puter crime but there is need for specific state legislation to criminalize "unauthor-
ized computer use" that is unique to computer technology).
109. For example, New York has amended several of its penal laws to permit
conviction of a computer criminal. See supra note 108 for list of amendments to N.Y.
Penal Code. It is important to note, however, that the New York Legislature is
currently considering enactment of a specific computer crime bill. See infra note 123.
Apparently, its purpose is to cover computer abuse that has not been reached by
amending existing penal laws. See generally LEGISLATION REPORT, supra note 108, at
16.
110. For example, although New York has attempted to partially amend its penal
code to reflect society's computerization, see supra note 108, there are still serious
prosecutorial limitations on computer criminals who are apprehended. In People v.
Weg, 113 Misc. 2d 1017, 450 N.Y.S.2d 957 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1982), the defendant,
who had used his employer's computer for personal benefit, without authorization,
was found not to have violated any law. The defendant, a computer specialist for the
New York City Board of Education, had been charged with theft of services for
unlawfully using the school system's computer to trace the geneology of horses he
owned in order to further his winnings. See Haberman, High-Tech Handicapper No
Thief, Judge Says, N.Y. Times, Apr. 25, 1982, at 51, col. 1. The court stated that the
defendant had not broken any laws since (1) he had legitimate access to the computer
and (2) the computer was not business, commercial or industrial equipment, as is
required by the statute, but rather an administrative tool. 113 Misc. 2d at 1024, 450
N.Y.S.2d at 961. The court suggested that perhaps it was time for the New York State
Legislature to enact specialized legislation to protect against new computer abuses.
Id. at 1023-24, 450 N.Y.S.2d at 961. See also State v. Thommen, No. 79-424B (Ind.
Crim. Ct. Marion Co. Feb. 14, 1980) which is discussed extensively in Gemignani,
supra note 57, at 713-19. The defendant, a statistician with the Indiana Department
of Mental Health, utilized his identification code to plug into his employer's com-
puter and obtain highly confidential security programs in the main data base. Id. at
714. Since these programs had no relationship to Thommen's work, it was considered
unauthorized access and the defendant was charged with theft of computer time. Id.
at 715. The prosecutor, seeking an indictment and conviction faced potentially
difficult procedural problems. Id. First, although it was impossible to ascertain
whether defendant had taken any money because of the nature of the State's intricate
computer system, the prosecutor chose to prosecute defendant for theft of computer
time because defendant had confessed to use of the computer time. Id. at 715-16.
Second, because defendant was charged under the State's existing theft statute,
which requires that something of value must have been taken, the prosecution had to
present extensive evidence that a valuable commodity had been taken. Id. at 716.
Even though defendant argued that there was no law prohibiting his activity and
that he had not deprived the State of anything, the jury was not convinced and found
him guilty. Id. at 717. The case illustrates that computer crime can present difficul-
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of explicit computer crime legislation."' Other states have drafted
bills that are awaiting further action.1 12 Apparently, state legislators
have recognized the unique nature of computers and the deficiencies
of current criminal laws." 3 Although each state computer crime stat-
ute is a unique complement to the state's penal code, a number of the
enacted state computer crime statutes resemble earlier proposed fed-
eral legislation." 4 As a result, they suffer from many of the same
inadequacies that were remedied in the federal bill by H.R. 1092. l l5
The main defect in these state statutes is that they contain the same
broad definition of "computer" as do previous federal bills. "6 Another
problem with some state computer crime statutes is that they infringe
on areas already covered by existing state legislation, without specify-
ing exactly which acts constitute crimes under the law and which do
not."i7 Nevertheless, this defect can be easily remedied by drafting
ties beyond those encompassed by prevailing state criminal laws, such as valuing loss
of computer time and computer programs in order to meet the statutory requisites.
111. See supra note 91 for list of enacted statutes.
112. In 1982, the following states considered computer crime legislation: Alaska,
Delaware, Massachusetts, Minnesota, New York, and Oregon. See COMPUTER CRIME
AND SECURITY, supra note 12, at 11.
113. As of the date of this publication, no prosecutions have been reported under
these statutes. However, this is not an indication of the lack of necessity for such
legislation. On the contrary, as the public becomes more aware of computer crime
statutes, the benefits of the legislation will become apparent and use of the statutes
will increase; no longer will there be a reluctance to formally report computer crime.
See supra note 20, discussing reasons why there are few formally-reported computer
crime cases.
114. See generally Becker, The Trial oj a Computer Crime, 2 COMPUTER L.J. 441,
447 (1980) (earlier proposed federal computer crime legislation appears to have been
the model for a significant number of state computer crime statutes). Compare S.
1766 and S. 240, supra note 70, with ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 12-2301, 13-2316
(West 1978 & Supp. 1982-1983); COLO. REI,. STAT. §§ 18-5.5-101, 102 (Supp. 1982);
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 752.791-.797 (West Supp. 1983-1984); N.M. STAT.
ANN. §§ 30-16A-1-4 (Supp. 1983); and R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 11-52-1.-.4 (1981).
115. See supra notes 79-81 and accompanying text for a discussion of these defects.
116. Compare the definition of computer, supra note 83, with statutes listed in
supra note 114. Unlike H.R. 1092, the state statutes are not restrictive enough to
exclude from their coverage automated typing equipment, a portable hand held
calculator, or any computer used for personal, family, and household purposes.
Hence, the public must rely on the discretion of state prosecutors to exclude these
types of prosecutions.
117. See, e.g., Gemignani, supra note 57, at 711; COMPUTER CRIME, supra note
13, at 129-133 (discussing overlap of state computer crime bills with state's existing
criminal code; for example, where new computer crime statute defines same terms as
existing statutes, courts will be faced with difficulty of determining precise defini-
tion). Compare ARIuz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-2301 (West 1978) with ARIz. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 13-1801 (West 1978) ("intent to . . . control property" spoken of differently
in these two statutes; as a result, Arizona courts will be faced with making the
determination).
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statutes with language restricting coverage to new types of crime
fostered by computers, such as unauthorized computer use,'1 8 rather
than to traditional crimes committed with the aid of a computer.",,
A further criticism of some existing state computer crime statutes is
that they do not provide for graduated penalties. 12( Graduated penal-
ties are appropriate for computer offenses because they deter abuse
without requiring unreasonable punishment.'12  One commendable
attribute of state statutes with graduated penalties is that, like their
federal counterpart, their flexibility accommodates the rapidly ex-
panding capabilities of computer technology.122
C. Proposed New York Computer Crime Legislation
Specific computer crime legislation was introduced in the New York
State Legislature in 1983.123 The proposed legislation would create an
entirely new article of the penal code, Article 186, entitled "Unau-
thorized Computer Abuse." 24 The new legislation is directed at defin-
118. See, e.g., State of New York Senate-Assembly, PROPOSED BILLS S.494, A.576,
1983-1984 REGULAR SESSION (Jan. 5, 1983) currently proposed New York computer
crime bill, S. 494, and LEGISLATION REPORT, supra note 108, at 4, 16 (Legislation
Report, in part, extensively comments on New York's proposed computer crime bill).
Drafters of S. 494 recognized the potential for conflict between a computer crime
statute and existing penal laws and, therefore, constructed a limited computer crime
bill that could not be criticized for overbroadness or duplication. See infra text
accompanying notes 141-42 for discussion of the advantages of a restrictive state
statute.
119. See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 125 & 136 for discussion of proposed
New York State computer crime legislation.
120. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 16-9-93 (1982); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.89
(West Supp. 1983); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-54-4 (1981); VA. CODE § 18.2-98.1 (1982).
121. See Computer Crime-Senate Bill S. 240, 10 MEM. ST. U. L. REV. 660, 666-
67 (1980) (gives example of possibility of unreasonable punishment in absence of
graduated penalties). Legislation providing for graduated penalties would "deter a
computer programmer from stealing his employer's computer time without subject-
ing him to unreasonable punishment." Id.
122. See Gemignani, supra note 57, at 712 (commenting on what an ideal com-
puter crime bill should contain).
123. On January 5, 1983, Senator Pisani introduced the bill into the Senate. It was
promptly referred to the Committee on Codes. The identical bill was introduced into
the Assembly by Assemblyman Murphy. It was also referred to the Committee on
Codes. See State of New York Senate-Assembly, PROPOSED BILLS S. 494, A. 576, 1983-
1984 REGULAR SESSION (Jan. 5, 1983) [hereinafter cited as S. 494]. Computer crime
experts also have recognized that New York is in need of penal legislation to suffi-
ciently combat computer crime. See LEGISLATION REPORT, supra note 108, at 1.
124. See supra note 123 at 1.
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ing and averting the new types of crimes that are possible by abusing
advancements in computer technology. 25
The proposed New York legislation, S. 494, begins with a preamble
which, using language similar to H.R. 1092,126 asserts that crime
involving computers is a growing problem in the State, both in the
government and in the private sector. Further, the preamble states,
the current penal laws should be amended to clearly and fully encom-
pass such crime. 127 Unlike H.R. 1092, S. 494 prescribes three gradu-
ated classifications and penalties to reflect the seriousness of the pro-
scribed behavior.2 8 In addition, the bill defines several commonly
used computer technology terms. 29 The bill concludes with proposed
125. See LEGISLATION REPORT, supra note 104, at 16. See generally Raysman and
Brown, Evolving Statutes on Computer Crime, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 11, 1983, at 2, col. 4
(similar comments on earlier proposed computer crime bills in New York).
126. See supra note 76 and accompanying text for an extensive discussion of H.R.
1092.
127. Compare preamble of H.R. 1092, supra note 72 with preamble language of
S. 494, supra note 123.
128. See LEGISLATION REPORT, supra note 108, at 20. See also S. 494, supra note
123 (unauthorized computer use is use of a computer without authority). S. 494
provides that:
[a] person 'uses a computer' when he causes the computer to perform or to
stop performing any operation [and] a person 'uses a computer without
authority' when (a) the computer is utilized in the operation of a building
or in or by any business, profession, occupation or educational, research or
government facility; and (b) he knowingly and intentionally uses the
computer (i) when he has no right or authority to do so or any reasonable
ground to believe that he has such right or authority; or (ii) when he has
previously received reasonable written notice that he has no right or
authority to do so, even if he does have right or authority to use the
computer in some other manner.
Id. at 2. Proposed Section 186.10, Unauthorized computer use in the third degree,
prohibits any unauthorized use of a computer; violation of this section is a class B
misdemeanor. A class B misdemeanor requires that the court impose a definite
sentence, not to exceed three months. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 70.15 (McKinney 1975).
Proposed Section 186.20 defines Unauthorized computer use in the second degree as
use of a computer without authority with intent to commit another misdemeanor or
to aid or conceal commission of such other crime. See S. 494, supra note 123. Such an
offense is a class A misdemeanor. Conviction of a class A misdemeanor requires the
court to impose a definite term of imprisonment, not to exceed one year. N.Y. PENAL
LAW § 70.15(1) (McKinney 1975). Conviction under Section 186.30, Unauthorized
computer use in the first degree, requires, in addition to unauthorized use, the intent
to commit a felony or to aid or conceal its commission. See S. 494, supra note 123.
Violation of this section is a class E felony, for which the jail term shall be fixed by
the court, and shall not exceed four years. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 70.00 (2)(e) (McKinney
1975).
129. See S. 494, supra note 123. These terms include the following:
(1) 'computer' means a device or group of devices which; pursuant to a
computer program, can automatically perform arithmetic, logical, storage
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amendments that would add violations for computer abuse 130 to the
current New York penal laws for larceny,1 3 1 theft of services, 132 and
offenses involving false written statements. 33 As a result, these sec-
tions will address traditional crimes committed with computer in-
volvement more effectively.
S. 494 is a modified version of the computer crime legislation
introduced in the New York Legislature in 1982, but never enacted. 34
In its present form, S. 494 is effective state legislation that will amply
cover criminal conduct committed with computer involvement. The
primary difference between S. 494 and either H.R. 1092 or existing
state computer crime statutes is that S. 494 is more limited in scope.
Rather than extensively addressing computer fraud and denial or theft
and retrieval operations with or on computer data and can communicate
the results, and includes any connected or directly related device, equip-
ment or facility which enables the computer to store, retrieve or communi-
cate to or from a person, another computer or another device the results of
computer operations, computer programs or computer data; (2) 'computer
data' means a representation of information, including the results of com-
puter operation, which has been prepared with the intention that, in a
suitable form, it be operated on by, or communicated to or from, a
computer; (3) 'computer program' means a representation of one or more
instructions . . . which, in a suitable form, can direct a computer to
perform one or more operations.
id. at 1-2.
130. See S. 494, supra note 123, at 2-4.
131. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 155.00 (McKinney 1975). The proposed amendment
would include computer data and computer programs within the meaning of "secret
scientific material." It would define the term "computer service" and include it in the
existing definition of "service."
132. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 165.15 (McKinney 1975). Proposed legislation would
amend "theft of services" to include as a violation the attempt to avoid payment for
computer time and, with the intent to obtain computer service, tampering with the
equipment.
133. N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 175.00, 175.20, 175.25 (McKinney 1975). Proposed
legislation would amend the sections regarding falsifying business records and tam-
pering with public records to include as violations the illegal use of computer data.
134. In 1982, two computer crime bills, S. 8310 and S. 8391, were introduced and
considered by the New York State Legislature but never enacted. See Raysman &
Brown, Evolving Statutes on Computer Crime, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 11, 1983, at 2, col. 4
for reference to these bills. These bills were modeled after the first federal computer
crime bill. See supra note 114 and accompanying text for a list of such state statutes.
Although the federal computer crime statute has undergone substantial modification
from the original bill, see NEWS RELEASE, supra note 2, the proposed 1982 New York
bills did not reflect these revisions. See LEGISLATION REPORT, supra note 108, at 2-3.
The two bills were carefully scrutinized by computer law experts Walter Klasson,
Esq. and Richard Raysman, Esq. who prepared an extensive report analyzing the
shortcomings of the bills. The report concluded that the bills were overbroad, dupli-
cative of existing New York penal sections and thus totally unacceptable. Id. at 1.
Consequently, they proposed an alternative statute that has become the computer
crime legislation currently pending in the legislature. Id. at A-1.
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of computer services,1 35 the drafters of S. 494 restricted its reach to
prohibiting unauthorized computer use. 36 Although S. 494 is not as
broad as is either the proposed federal bill or other state legislation
directed at computer crime, this neither affects the bill's adaptability
to future growth within the field of computer technology nor hinders
the state prosecutor's ability to seek a conviction. 13
The narrow approach of S. 494 is suitable for New York because the
bill has been carefully drafted to work in conjunction with the existing
penal code. ' 38 Since New York's penal code is extensive in its coverage
of criminal activity, 39 it is unnecessary for New York to follow the
lead of other states that have adopted broader computer crime stat-
utes. 40 The advantages of a restrictive state statute are two-fold.
First, it precisely defines the wrongful activity and cannot be criti-
cized for overbroadness or ambiguity.14' Second, there is no risk that
the computer bill will overlap other penal laws, resulting in the need
for courts to resolve the discrepancies. 142
Unlike H.R. 1092 or previously proposed New York legislation, S.
494 provides graduated penalties and classifications of computer
crime,143 thereby avoiding the possibility of unreasonable penalties. 144
135. See, e.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-2301, 13-2316 (West 1978 & Supp.
1982-1983) ("[a] person commits computer fraud... by accessing, altering, damag-
ing, or destroying without authorization any computer, computer system, computer
network ... with the intent to devise or execute any scheme or artifice to defraud,
deceive, or control property or services by means of false or fraudulent pretenses,
representations or promises"); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-5.5-101, 102 (Supp. 1982)
(prescribes the knowing use of a computer for fraudulent purposes, the malicious
destruction of a computer, and the unauthorized use or alteration of a computer or
its data); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 815.00-07 (West Supp. 1983) (prescribes offenses
against intellectual property including data and programs, offenses against computer
equipment and supplies, and offenses against computer users).
136. See supra note 128 and accompanying text for scope of S. 494.
137. A restrictive state computer crime bill does not jeopardize the state prosecu-
tor's ability to obtain a conviction provided it was designed to complement the state's
existing penal code; what is not within the reach of the limited computer crime
legislation is covered by amendment of existing penal sections. See LEGISLATION
REPORT, supra note 108, at 4, 16 for discussion of similar rationale underlying S. 494.
138. See LEGISLATION REPORT, supra note 108, at 4, 16.
139. Id. at 4.
140. See supra notes 114-16 and accompanying text for list of such statutes.
141. See supra note 80 and accompanying text (S. 494 is a more precise bill than is
federal bill H.R. 1092).
142. See supra notes 108, 117 and accompanying text for discussion and examples
of the risk of overlap.
143. On recommendation, the Legislature corrected the conflict with the pattern
of New York's existing penal laws, which provide for graduated penalties, by provid-
ing for such penalties; in earlier proposed bills, all offenses were classified as felonies.
See LEGISLATION REPORT, supra note 108, at 20.
144. See supra note 121 and accompanying text for an example of the possibility of
unreasonable penalties.
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL
A criticism of S. 494, however, is that the bill does not provide a
penalty based on the value of use stolen or services stolen; 145 it simply
prescribes varying misdemeanor and felony grade penalties. 4 Since
the possibility for very costly crime exists, legislation should provide
fines as an added deterrent. 147
S. 494 improves earlier New York proposals by simplifying com-
puter terminology used in the bill. 148 Computer crime legislation
should not attempt to define in detail numerous aspects of computer
terminology. Drafters of legislation regarding computer technology
must be cautious in their use of technical terms because the terms do
not have uniform definitions and are subject to judicial interpreta-
tions. 149 S. 494 does not suffer from an overbroad definition of "com-
puter." 150 While not explicitly excluding computers used for hobbies
and entertainment, the definition of "computer" in S. 494 151 limits the
application of the statute to computers used in business, education and
government. 52
S. 494 reflects unique aspects of New York's penal code and recent
developments in this area by the legislature. 53 The bill addresses the
specialized problems raised by computers without unnecessarily in-
fringing on areas already covered by existing legislation. S. 494 is
145. See LEGISLATION REPORT, supra note 108, at 19. Computer crime experts
suggested that the New York Legislature add a felony grade of the crime based on the
value of services stolen. Id.
See supra note 128 for discussion of penalty grades.
146. Several state computer crime statutes contain penalty provisions that relate
directly to the value of the item stolen, or the loss or damage suffered. See, e.g., CAL.
PENAL CODE § 502(e) (West Supp. 1983); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-5.5-102(3) (Supp.
1982); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 815.04 (West. Supp. 1983); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 16-
9(c) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1983-1984); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 609.88-.89 (West Supp.
1983); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 30-16A-3-4 (Supp. 1982); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-703
(Supp. 1979).
147. See LEGISLATION REPORT, supra note 108, at 6-9. Previously considered com-
puter crime bills, S. 8310 and S. 8391, included definitions of access, computer,
computer network, computer system, computer program, computer software, finan-
cial instrument, property, services, intellectual property, and data. Id. See infra text
accompanying note 148 for a discussion of the need for simplified terminology.
148. See Raysman & Brown, Evolving Statutes on Computer Crime, N.Y.L.J.,
Jan. 11, 1983, at 2, col. 1.
149. See supra notes 83, 116 and accompanying text.
150. See supra note 129 for definition of "computer."
151. See LEGISLATION REPORT, supra note 108, at A-1. In narrowing the scope of
the legislation, proposers of S. 494 intentionally excluded from the legislation's reach
computers used exclusively for personal purposes. Id.
152. Id. at 22.
153. See LEGISLATION REPORT, supra note 108, at 22 for a discussion of the unique
aspects of the New York proposed computer crime legislation.
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effective state legislation because it does not simply adopt statutory
language from another jurisdiction.154 Consequently, it did not inherit
the deficiencies existent in earlier legislation. 55
IV. Alternative for Legislative Action
There are three legislative alternatives with regard to computer
crime. First, existing criminal laws can be left untouched, relying on
the courts to liberally construe statutory requisites so as to include
computer crime. Second, existing criminal laws can be amended to
address certain aspects of computer abuse. Third, new, specific com-
puter crime legislation can be drafted and enacted to effectively en-
compass such criminal activity.
Clearly, the first alternative, leaving existing criminal laws un-
touched, will not suffice on either the federal or state level. On the
federal level, the third alternative, enactment of precise computer
crime legislation; is needed to remedy the disagreement among district
and circuit courts on whether certain existing federal statutes pro-
scribe computer-assisted crime. 56 In addition, new legislation is
needed to encourage reporting of such crime 57 to uniformly punish
the offenders, 58 and to deter potential abusers. 55 The potential for
computer abuse has been increasing steadily; H.R. 1092 is appropriate
federal legislation to address such criminal abuse.160
It is apparent that present state procedures for dealing with com-
puter crime are inadequate, as is their federal counterpart.' 6' Applica-
tion of traditional state criminal codes to computer abuse has created
significant limitations and obstacles to effective prosecution. Existing
154, See Krieger, Current and Proposed Computer Crime Legislation, 2 CoM-
PUTER L.J. 721 (1980) (complete text of existing and proposed legislation).
155. See supra notes 84-86 and accompanying text.
156. See supra notes 53 & 57 and accompanying text for examples of this disagree-
ment.
157. See supra note 68 and accompanying text for problems associated with
disparate penalty limitations.
158. See supra notes 66 & 89 and accompanying text for discussion of deterrent
effect computer crime legislation will have.
159. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
160. See Ingraham, On Charging Computer Crime, 2 COMPUTER L.J. 429 (1980)
(argument that special recognition is not needed for computer crimes overlooks basic
need for laws to proscribe certain types of conduct, as well as to enable the redress of
wrongs).
161. See supra notes 93, 107, 110 and accompanying text for discussion of the
ineffectiveness of the present state procedures.
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state penal codes must be amended to encompass computer crime. On
the state level, a combination of the second and third alternative is the
most advantageous. Amendment of existing penal laws, the second
alternative, may be sufficient to combat traditional crime that now
occurs in a new computerized form.1 62 This approach, however, var-
ies with the adaptability of a state's existing penal code. 16 3 Even if
states have extensive penal codes which can be amended in this way,
the third alternative, enactment of precise computer crime legislation
is needed to cover criminal conduct such as unauthorized computer
use 6 4 that is specifically created by computer technology. Such legis-
lation should be more limited in scope than is the proposed federal
bill. 1 5 New York's S. 494 is an appropriate model for combining the
second and third alternatives. Clearly, adequate legal redress on the
state level is as imperative as is the corresponding need on the federal
level.
V. Conclusion
Advancements in computerization and the growing use of com-
puters in business, government, education, and the private sector 166
has resulted in the expanding potential for criminal infiltration. The
problems of computer crime are in great part attributable to the
shortcomings of our criminal laws and the reluctance of our legal
establishments to change.
Wrongful computer activity was not envisioned when the current
criminal laws were written. The difficulties in applying traditional
162. See, e.g., LEGISLATION REPORT, supra note 108, at 4 (New York's penal laws
broadly cover traditional criminal activity, into which many aspects of wrongful
computer abuse can be placed).
163. A state's penal code can only be amended to the extent that it already
proscribes the action as illegal. For instance, if a state does not have a law prohibiting
theft of services, such law cannot be amended to prohibit the act committed with
computer involvement. As a result, it will be more effective for the state to enact a
broad new computer crime bill. See COMPUTER CRIME, supra note 13, at 129-131
(discussing such difficulties with Florida's penal laws).
164. See, e.g., supra note 109 and accompanying text (although New York has
amended several of its categories of crime to include computer related offenses,
experts still recognize the continuing need for a limited computer crime statute).
165. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 136 & 138 discussing New York's
proposed computer crime bill.
166. In today's high technology world, computers are vital to our everyday lives.
See NEWS RELEASE, supra note 2. It is estimated that six million American homes now
have personal computers (micro-computers). Id. In the not too distant future, there
will be a computer terminal on every desk and in every home.
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laws to such activity are significant.1 7 Beneficial and efficient use of
computer technology requires that effective legislation be promptly
enacted. The expansion of computer use will be followed by increas-
ing levels of computer crime. Criminal laws for computer crime on
both the federal and state level must be developed to curb these
abuses. 168
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167. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
168. Pending the enactment of computer crime legislation, federal and state pros-
ecutors will have to continue to rely on the present criminal codes with all their
inadequacies and inconsistencies.

